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and Peter N. Barsoom
-
In the past few years many social scientists interested in cooperation have
turned their attention to the problem of compliance in international regulatory
regimes. Much of the empirical research in this area has been conducted by a
group composed mainly of qualitative political scientists and scholars inter"
ested in international law. 1 Its message is that (1) compliance is generally quitq
good; (2) this high level of compliance has been achieved with little attention to
enforcement; (3) those compliance problems that do exist are best addressed as
management rather than enforcement problems; and (4) the managemen~
rather than the enforcement approach holds the key to the evolution of futurd
regulatory cooperation in the international system. As Oran Young notes, "AJ
new understanding of the bases of compliance-one that treats compliance as al
management problem rather than an enforcement problem and that hasr
profound practical as well as theoretical implications-is making itself feltl
among students of international relations."2 In short, not only are the dreary
expectations born of factors such as relative gains concerns, collective action
problems, anarchy, and fears of self-interested exploitation incorrect but also I
the enforcement limitations that always have appeared to sharply bound the
contributions of international law and many international institutions now
appear to have been exaggerated.
In this essay we will argue that the empirical findings of this group, which we
refer to as the "managerial" school, are interesting and important but that its
An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the International
Studies Association, Chicago, February 1994. The authors thank Abram Chayes, Robert Keohane,
Marc Levy, Ron Mitchell, Ken Dye, Michael Ross, the editor of International Organization, and the
anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The authors also acknowledge the support of the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation to the Center of International Studies, Princeton
University.
1. For example, see Arora and Cason 1995; Chayes and Chayes 1m; 1991; 1993a; 1993b; Duffy
1988; Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993; Hawkins 1984; Mitchell 1993; 1994a; 1994b; 1995; Scholz
1984; Sparrow 1994; Young 1989; and 1994.
2. Young's quotation is taken from the dust jacket of Mitchell 1994a.
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policy inferences are dangerously contaminated by selection problems. If we
restrict our attention to those regulatory treaties that prescribe reductions in a
collectively dysfunctional behavior (e.g., tariffs, arms increases), evidence
suggests that the high level of compliance and the marginality of enforcement
result from the fact that most treaties require states to make only modest
departures from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement.
This creates a situation where states often are presented with negligible
benefits for even unpunished defections; hence the amount of enforcement
needed to maintain cooperation is modest. Nothing is wrong with this situation
in itself, but it is unlikely to provide the model for the future that the
managerialists claim. Even if we assume that the absolute value of the benefits
generated by this small amount of regulation is relatively large, further progress
in international regulatory cooperation will almost certainly require the
creation of agreements that present far greater incentives to defect than those
currently in place (e.g., more demanding environmental standards, fewer
nontariff barriers, steeper arms reductions). We have precious little evidence
that such progress can be obtained in the absence of better enforcement.
After discussing the problems posed by endogeneity and selection, we
present the theoretical argument for linking enforcement level to what we call
"depth of cooperation'; and examine the extent to which deep cooperation has
been achieved without enforcement. We then present a number of prominent
exceptions to the managerial school's unqualified generalizations about the
causes and cures of noncompliance. Finally, we discuss the strategic implica-
tions of the evolution of increasingly cooperative regimes.
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The managerial thesis
The bedrock of the managerial school is the finding that state compliance with
international agreements is generally quite good and that enforcement has
played little or no role in achieving and maintaining that record. In Abram
Chayes and Antonia Chayes's words, what ensures compliance is not the threat
of punishment but "a plastic process of interaction among the parties
concerned in which the effort is to reestablish, in the microcontext of the
particular dispute, the balance of advantage that brought the agreement into
existence."3 For the members of the managerial school, "noncompliance is not
necessarily, perhaps not even usually, the result of deliberate defiance of the
legal standard."4 On those rare occasions when compliance problems do occur
they should not be viewed as violations or self-interested attempts at exploita-
tion, but as isolated administrative breakdowns. The causes of noncompliance
are to be found in (1) the ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaties, (2) the
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4. Ibid., 301.
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Not surprisingly, the managerial school takes a dim view of formal and even
informal enforcement measures. Punishment not only is inappropriate given
the absence of any exploitative intent but it is too costly, too political, and too
coercive. As Ronald Mitchell notes, "Retaliatory non-compliance often proves
unlikely because the costs of any individual violation may not warrant a
response and it cannot be specifically targeted, imposing costs on those that
have consistently complied without hurting the targeted violator enough to
change its behavior."6 As a result, according to Young, "arrangements
featuring enforcement as a means of eliciting compliance are not of much use
in international society."7 Since sanctions usually are more successful against
economically vulnerable and politically weak countries and "unilateral sanc-
tions can be imposed only by the major powers, their legitimacy as a device for
treaty enforcement is deeply suspect," as Chayes and Chayes point out.s
Moreover, retaliation for violating a treaty may risk the breakdown of current
and future cooperation:
the actor considering retaliation must also think of the possible future costs.
It may be dangerous to prejudice the possibility of support from the violator
at some point in time in the future when it may be needed. ...[T]he risk of
setting off "a long echo of alternating retaliations" will often dwarf the con-
sequences of overlooking what are arguably relatively minor or "technical"
violations.9
Instances of apparent noncompliance are problems to be solved, rather than
violations that have to be punished. According to Chayes and Chayes, "As in
other managerial situations, the dominant atmosphere is that of actors engaged
in a cooperative venture, in which performance that seems for some reason
unsatisfactory represents a problem to be solved by mutual consultation and
analysis, rather than an offense to be punished. Persuasion and argument are
the principal motors of this process."IO The strategies necessary to induce
compliance and maintain cooperation involve: (1) improving dispute resolution
procedures, (2) technical and financial assistance, and (3) increasing transpar-
ency. The last is especially important: "For a party deliberately contemplating
violation, the high probability of discovery reduces the expected benefits rather
than increasing the costs and would thus deter violation regardless of the
prospect of sanctions."ll
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9. Ibid. The authors quote Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic
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It is not difficult to appreciate why the findings of the managerial school suggest
that both international institutions and even international law have a far
brighter future than most international relations specialists have believed for
the past fifty years. Apart from sharply contradicting the pessimistic expecta-
tions of many realists and neorealists about the inability of cooperation and
self-regulation to flourish in an anarchic world, they also run counter to the
claims of cooperation researchers in the rational-choice tradition. Such
researchers emphasize the centrality of enforcement concerns in regulatory
environments and characterize them as mixed-motive games, where the danger
of self-interested exploitation is significant, as opposed to coordination games,
where it is not.12 Such findings certainly add credibility to the frequent
speculation that the rational-choice tradition's affection for the repeated
prisoners' dilemma has led it to overemphasize enforcement and underempha-
size the potential for voluntary compliance and noncoercive dispute resolution.
In trying to understand the prescriptive significance of the managerialists'
compliance findings, it is useful to consider the following hypothetical story. An
article has recently appeared in an education journal criticizing the state of
musical education in an age of funding cutbacks. The author, a longtime music
teacher, argues that such cutbacks inevitably have dire consequences for the
quality of school music programs. A member of the school board who has
aggressively supported the elimination of frivolous expenditures is skeptical of
what she believes to be characteristically self-interested reasoning. In an effort
to get to the bottom of the issue, she attends fifteen concerts in her district and
fifteen concerts in a rival district that has not reduced its support of music
education or extracurricular activities. She finds that the quality of the two
orchestras as measured by the number of mistakes they made to be pretty much
the same and quite low in both cases. Noting that the orchestras in h~r district
have achieved this high level of performance despite a 75 percent reduction in
the number of rehearsals, she is delighted. Not only has she demonstrated that
the cutbacks have had no effect on school orchestras but she believes that she
has confirmed her long-held suspicion that rehearsals do not make school
orchestras better, they simply line the pockets of music teachers eager to buy
hot tubs and Steinway pianos.
These conclusions may, however, be invalid. It is likely that orchestras in her
district may have adapted to the decrease in resources by playing less
demanding pieces. No orchestra is eager to embarrass itself, and one of the
most effective ways to avoid doing so is to play Haydn rather than Mahler or
Stravinsky. Unless the school board member counting mistakes figures out a
way to control for the difficulty of repertoire, we do not really know what her
12. See, for example, Abreu 1988; Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1986; 1989; Bayard and Elliott
1994; Downs and Rocke 1995; Hungerford 1991; Martin 1992; Staiger 1995; and Sykes 1990.
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findings tell us about the impact of the budget cuts. A treaty, like the selection
of an orchestra's repertoire, is also an endogenous strategy. States choose the
treaties they make from an infinitely large set of possible treaties. If some
treaties are more likely to be complied with than others or require more
enforcement than others, this will almost certainly affect the choices states
make. Just as orchestras will usually avoid music that they cannot play fairly
well, states will rarely spend a great deal of time and effort negotiating
agreements that will continually be violated. This inevitably places limitations
on the inferences we can make from compliance data alone. As in the case of
the orchestra's mistakes, we do not know what a high compliance rate really
implies. Does it mean that even in the absence of enforcement states will
comply with any agreement from the set of all possible agreements, or does it
mean that states only make agreements that do not require much enforcement?
If the latter is the case, what are the implications for the future of regulatory
cooperation?
To even begin to overcome the problems that endogeneity poses for
understanding the role of enforcement in regulatory compliance, we need to
control for the basis of state selection; that is, those characteristics of
international agreements that play the same role for states as musical difficulty
does for the school orchestras. One likely candidate is what we have termed the
depth of cooperation. International political economists define the depth of an
agreement by the extent to which it requires behind-the-border integration
with regard to social and environmental standards as well as with regard to the
reduction of barriers to trade. Here, however, the depth of an agreement refers
to the extent to which it captures the collective benefits that are available
through perfect cooperation in one particular policy area. Given the difficulties
involved in identifying the cooperative potential of an ideal ~reaty, it is most
useful to think of a treaty's depth of cooperation as the extent to which it
requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence. If we
are examining the critical subset of regulatory treaties that require states to
reduce some collectively dysfunctional behavior like tariffs or pollution, a
treaty's theoretical depth of cooperation would refer to the reduction it
required relative to a counterfactual estimate of the tariff or pollution level that
would exist in the absence of a treaty. Of course, the depth of cooperation that
a treaty actually achieved might be quite different than this figure. Here we
measure depth of cooperation by the treaty level because that is the figure
which serves as the basis for judging the level of compliance. In the absence of a
trustworthy theoretical estimate of this counterfactual, it could be based on the
status quo at the time an agreement was signed or on a prediction derived from
the year-to-year change rate prior to that time.
Either estimate of depth of cooperation is obviously quite crude. There are
doubtless policy areas in which, for any number of reasons, the potential for
cooperation is much smaller than others. In such cases our depth measure will
make cooperation in these areas appear shallower than it really is. Yet if one is
: 1989; Bayard and Elliott
)5; and Sykes 1990.
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FIGURE 1. One-period utility of treaty compliance versus defection
I
disincentive exists, states must resort to a punishment for defection. In this
case, one punishment strategy prescribes that state A begin by observing the
treaty, but if B violates it, even modestly, state A should respond by abrogating
the agreement (or othelWise reducing its level of compliance) for some
specified period of time. During cooperative periods each side's tariff is
supposed to be limited to pot < Pt, and}'8 < pg', while in the punishment
periods both sides raise tariffs to some noncooperative level. The most extreme
punishment strategy, often called the "grim strategy," occurs when the
response to any violation is permanent reversion to the noncooperative Nash
equilibrium. A punishment strategy is sufficient to enforce a treaty when each
side knows that if it cheats it will suffer enough from the punishment that the
net benefit will not be positive.
To make this more concrete, consider an example where the noncooperative
tariff is at a level of 100 percent for each side, and plausible treaties would
provide for symmetric reductions in tariffs for each side. is Figure 1 compares
the one-period utility of both sides observing the treaty with the temptation to
defect. The temptation to cheat in this model rises rapidly with the cooperative-
ness of the treaty, while the treaty benefits rise less rapidly. This is what
imposes a limit on which treaties can be supported. Figure 2 shows the
punishment periods necessary to support treaties of various sizes. A shorter
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15. Of course, in the multiperiod model, the feasibility of maintaining this treaty depends on the
discount factor, a, as well as on the previous parameters. In this case, we use a discount factor of
a = .95, couesponding to an interest rate of 5 percent.
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period would make the treaty vulnerable to cheating because it would be
insufficient to remove all of the gains from violating the treaty. For example, a
treaty that specifies a 5 percent reduction in tariffs only requires a punishment
of. two periods; the best treaty that can be supported with the maximal
punishment of infinite duration is 37.19 percent. The increase in the ratio of the
benefit of cheating to the benefit of cooperating means that increasingly severe
punishments are necessary to deter defection-here severity means length of
punishment-as the benefits of the treaty and corresponding restrictiveness of
its requirements increase. Although the rate of increase in utility with the
increase in punishment length decreases, the utility obtainable by very long
punishments is still many times that of the utility obtainable with punishment
lengths of one or two periods. The essential point the graph demonstrates is the
deeper the agreement is, the greater the punishments required to support it.
The only relevant criterion is that the punishment must hurt the transgressor
state at least as much as that state could gain by the violation. This does not
imply that, say, a certain amount of trade restriction should be punished by an
equal trade restriction (tit-for-tat); nor does it mean that the transgressor be
punished at least as much as the transgressor's violation hurt the other party.
Although both of these standards possess aspects of fairness, neither is relevant
to supporting the treaty equilibrium. Fairness and justice must take a back seat
to the correct disincentive.
The specific mechanism by which states punish violations is less relevant to
the relationship between depth of cooperation and enforcement than is the
magnitude of enforcement. Although we motivate the model by using a case of 16. On the
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centralized enforcement for convenience, nothing in the analysis precludes
effective decentralized enforcement schemes. Enforcement can occur through
linkages, as in the case of the Soviet Union and United States during the
Kissinger years; through formal institutions such as the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Dispute Settlement Procedure; through unilateral
actions, as in the U.S. enforcement of fishery and wildlife agreements under the
Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson amendments; or by domestic law as in the
European Union and environmental treaties. Given the weakness of current
international institutions and the relative difficulty in mobilizing formal
sanctions, we suspect-like the majority of managerialists-that the most
effective enforcement schemes may well be decentralized and not involve
perfectly coordinated action by every signatory of a multilateral agreement.16
This, however, does not negate the connection between depth of cooperation
and the magnitude of the punishment necessary to maintain compliance in
mixed-motive games.
Discussion
J
This logical connection between the depth of cooperation represented by a
given treaty and the amount of enforcement that is needed in mixed-motive
games suggests that evaluating the importance of enforcement by examining
how high compliance is when it is low or absent might be misleading. We need
to worry about the possibility that both the high rate of compliance and relative
absence of enforcement threats are due not so much to the irrelevance of
enforcement as to the fact that states are avoiding deep cooperation-and the
benefits it holds whenever a prisoners' dilemma situation exists-because they
are unwilling or unable to pay the costs of enforcement. If this were true,
prescribing that states ignore enforcement in favor of other compliance
strategies would be equivalent to telling the school orchestras to avoid wasting
their time rehearsing. Just as the latter would condemn the orchestras to a
repertoire of simple compositions, the prescriptions of the managerial school
would condemn states to making agreements that represent solutions to
coordination games and shallow prisoners' dilemmas.
Of course, knowing that statistics about the role of enforcement might be
misleading is hardly equivalent to establishing its importance as a compliance
strategy. If members of the managerial school are correct in believing in their
(usually implicit) assumption that mixed-motive games and prisoners' dilem-
mas playa much smaller role in critical regulatory arenas than game theorists
assume, the argument fizzles. Unfortunately, settling this controversy is no easy
matter. Utility functions are notoriously difficult to access directly and any
attempt to cope with selection by estimating the character of the set of
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regulatory agreements that are potentially possible would be hopelessly
circular.
Given the circumstances, it seems advisable to sidestep any attempt to
inventory the nature of the underlying game and to evaluate some of the
implications of the rival theories. We examine two. First, we will assess the
depth of cooperation and the level of enforcement connected with prominent
regulatory agreements that involve the reduction of behaviors that states have
concluded are collectively counterproductive but that contain few enforcement
provisions. Ideally, one would like to examine the correlation between
enforcement and depth of cooperation, but as we noted above, we agree with
the managerial school's observation that such strongly enforced regulatory
agreements are relatively rare. If the managerial school is correct, the absence
of strong enforcement provisions or the informal threat of enforcement should
have no bearing on the depth of cooperation. There should be numerous
examples of states agreeing to alter dramatically the trajectory that they were
following at the time a treaty was signed while paying little attention to
enforcement. If the game theorists are correct that most important regulatory
agreements are mixed-motive games of some variety, any tendency of states to
avoid committing themselves to punishing noncompliance is likely to be
associated with either a world in which there are relatively few deeply
cooperative agreements or in which violations run rampant. Since we agree that
while regulatory violations exist they are not frequent, we expect the former to
be true.
Second, we will examine the managerial school's claim that self-interest
rarely plays a conspicuous role in the treaty violations that do take place and
that violations are driven instead solely by a combination of the ambiguity of
treaties, the capacity limitations of states, and uncontrollable social and
economic changes. We are skeptical of this assertion because the set of
violations should be less distorted by selection than the set of treaties. This is
true because we expect that, ceteris paribus, the rate of violation connected
with mixed-motive game treaties should in the absence of perfect information
and appropriate enforcement be much higher than the rate of violation
connected with coordination game treaties. Hence, even if there are fewer such
treaties they would be overrepresented relative to coordination game based-
treaties in any sample of violations.
The rarity of deep cooperation
Are we correct in our suspicion that inferences about the importance of
enforcement are likely to be contaminated by selection? That is, does evidence
show that there is little need for enforcement because there is little deep
cooperation? Let us begin by considering the set of arms agreements that the
United States has made since 1945 (see appendix B). We note at the outset
that, however valuable, a number of the treaties such as the "Hot Line"
17. Chayes
18. Downs;
19. ArmsC
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Neither the initial Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Interim Agree-
ment nor SALT II was characterized by much depth. The interim agreement
froze the number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers at the
status quo level (the United States had none under construction at the time and
the Soviet Union was permitted to complete those it was building), but it
allowed increases in the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) on both sides and failed significantly to restrict qualitative improve-
ments in launchers, missiles, or a host of systems that allowed both sides to
increase their nuclear capabilities,zo SALT II required significant reductions in
each side's number of operational launchers or bombers but permitted the
number of ICBMs equipped with multiple independently targeted reentry
vehicles (MIRVed ICBMs) to increase by forty percent between the time of
signing and 1985. When this figure is added to the number of cruise missiles
permitted each bomber, the total number of nuclear weapons was allowed to
increase 50-70 percent. As Jozef Goldblat notes, "There is a remarkable
compatibility between the Treaty limitations and the projected strategic
nuclear weapons programs of both sides."21
Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), conventional forces in Europe
(CFE), and the strategic arms reduction talks (START) agreements are
deeper, of course. The first prescribes the elimination of intermediate- and
shorter-range missiles in Europe; the second dramatically reduced conven-
tional forces; and th4 third cuts the arsenals of strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles that come under the agreement by about 30 percent and cuts warheads
by 40 percent.22 While one can argue in connection with START that the
number of accountable weapons is smaller than the actual number of weapons,
the cuts are significant in terms of either the status quo at the time of signing
and each state's trajectory. Do these suggest that deep agreements that make
no provisions for enforcement play an important role in arms control?
There is no easy answer. On the one hand, we are inclined to simply include
these agreements in the set of deep regulatory agreements that seem to require
little enforcement. We do not claim that such agreements do not exist-they
clearly do-simply that many important prospective agreements require
enforcement. Yet, it is not clear that these agreements are as deep as they
appear to be. After all, the counterfactual-whether estimated on the basis of
the status quo or the trajectory of year to year differences in arms production-
represents the behavior of a political system that no longer exists. No one
would gauge the depth of cooperation represented by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) by comparing German behavior during wartime
with German behavior after the war.
23. Barrett
24. MurdocJ
25. The quo
20. Ibid., 168.
21. Goldblat 1993,35.
22. Arms Control and Disannament Agency 1991.
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Managerialists might respond to this analysis by arguing that there are good
reasons for believing that the connection between enforcement and depth of
cooperation in the areas of international trade and the environment is different
from that connection in security. Not only are many of the actors obviously
different but security historically has been dominated by the realist logic that
managerialists find so inadequate. We are not unsympathetic to this argument.
The dynamics of cooperation may indeed differ across policy areas, just as they
may vary within the same policy area over time. Nonetheless, at least with
respect to the relationship between enforcement and depth of cooperation, the
areas are not as different as one might imagine or as some might hope.
Recent environmental agreements to control transboundary pollution, for
instance, exhibit a similar lack of depth. Despite the apparently large cutbacks
in chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions, the Montreal Protocol provided few
benefits to cooperation and little incentive to defect from the agreement. Scott
Barrett has argued that "the Montreal Protocol may not have increased global
net benefits substantially compared with the noncooperative outcome."23 In
their extensive empirical analysis, James Murdoch and Todd Sandler have
similarly concluded that "the Montreal Protocol was enacted because it
codified reductions in CFC emissions that polluters were voluntarily prepared
to accomplish. ...[T]he Montreal Protocol may be more symbolic than a true
instance of a cooperative equilibrium."24 In fact, most of the cutbacks in
emissions preceded the ratification of the Montreal Protocol.
Perhaps the best test of the relationship between the depth of cooperation
and enforcement can be found when we examine the history of a specific policy
area in which regulations have become increasingly strict over time. The game
theorist would predict that as regulatory rules tighten, the magnitude of the
punishment needed to deter defection would also have to increase~ Even if the
system achieves some dynamic equilibrium, there should be some tangible sign
of this under imperfect information.
If we discount the events that occurred in arms control after the downfall of
the Soviet empire, the best examples of steadily increasing depth of coopera-
tion'are to be found in the areas of trade and European integration. In each
case the role of enforcement has increased accordingly. Thomas Bayard and
Kimberly Elliott, for example, conclude that the Uruguay Round has "substan-
tially reduced many of the most egregious trade barriers around the world," but
they also emphasize the enhanced ability of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) to respond to and punish trade violations.25 The WTO's procedures for
dealing with violations are now more automatic and less manipulable by
individual parties. Time limits on the establishment of panels have now been
23. Barrett 1994, 892.
24. Murdoch and Sandler 1994, 2.
25. The quotation is from Bayard and Elliott 1994,336.
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set to nine months with the conclusion of panels within eighteen months,
eliminating the inexorable delays under GATT. The principle of consensus
voting in the adoption of panel reports has been reversed; previously, both
parties to a dispute had an automatic veto on panel recommendations and
retaliation. The new system provides for automatic adoption of panel reports,
including approval for retaliation, unless a unanimous consensus rejects it.
Previously, sanctions were utilized only once in GATT's history. Now,
retaliation will be authorized automatically in the absence of a withdrawal of
the offending practice or compensation to the defendant. We believe that the
negotiating history of the WTO demonstrates that the more demanding levels
of cooperation achieved by the Uruguay Round would not have been possible
without its having reduced the likelihood of self-interested exploitation by
member states.
The deepening of European integration exhibits a similar pattern. Simulta-
neous with the increased cooperation embodied in the Maastricht Treaty,
Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli point out with regard to the European
Court of Justice that "the member states chose to strengthen the Court's power
to monitor and punish defections."26 In the European case, enforcement took
the form of penetration of European Community (EC) law into the domestic
law of its members states}7 It is difficult to believe that this increased
enforcement represents nothing more than an attempt to pacify the few naive
realists who remain influential in member states.
The causes and cures of noncompliance
The principal goal of the managerial school's investigation of compliance is
to design more effective strategies for overcoming compliance problems in
regulatory regimes. It is thus useful to shift our attention away from the
likelihood of selection and the relationship between depth of cooperation and
enforcement to why those compliance problems that do exist have occurred
and how they might be remedied.
As noted above, selection bias should affect an examination of the reasons
that compliance problems arise and their solutions less than it would an
analysis of which type of cooperative agreements exist. We will briefly consider,
first, the extent to which compliance problems appear to be caused by the
ambiguity of treaties, the capacity limitations of states, and uncontrollable
social and economic changes rather than the calculation of states bent on
exploiting other states, as the managerial school alleges; and, second, extent to
which compliance problems appear to be solved by improving dispute resolu-
tion procedures, technical and financial assistance, and transparency without
any attention to increased enforcement.
28. Kaufmar
29. Goldmar
30. Kaufmar
31. Ikle 1961
26. Burley and Mattli 1993, 74.
27. Ibid., 43.
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Scholars in the field of anns control agree that the Washington Naval Treaty
of 1923 not only was the most path breaking and ambitious anns control
agreement ever fonnulated but also experienced the most compliance prob-
lems. For example, the treaty pennitted the conversion of battle cruisers into
aircraft carriers up to a maximum of 33,000 tons, yet both the U .5.5. Lexington
and Saratoga were closer to 36,000 tons. For their part as Robert Kaufman
notes, the Japanese "broke the rules seriously, systematically, and often
clandestinely."28 Emily Goldman reports that its cruiser Atago exceeded its
announced size by 20 percent, and its Yamato was 95 percent heavier than
announced and carried eighteen-inch rather than sixteen-inch guns. Italy's
Glonza exceeded its announced size by 20 percent}9 To what extent were these
problems attributable to the ambiguity of the treaty, the capacity limitations of
the states, or uncontrollable social and economic changes?
Ambiguity was certainly a problem, especially with regard to the extent to
which the Japanese violated their commitment not to build fortifications on the
Mandates. The treaty left tenDS like "naval base" and "fortification" unde-
fined. However, ambiguity in some areas does not detract from the purposeful-
ness and exploitative character of the violations in other areas, such as
shipbuilding. Both Kaufman and Goldman provide overwhelming evidence
that more than confusion over treaty parameters was behind the treaty
violations on the part of all parties during the interwar years. It would be even
more implausible to attribute the myriad violations to capacity limitations or
the sort of uncontrollable social and economic changes that are usually covered
by the rebus sic stantibus standard.
Since the pattern of violations that plagued the Washington Treaty never was
brought under control, any analysis of how control might have been achieved is
entirely speculative. It is difficult to imagine, however, that it could have
occurred purely through dispute resolution; and technical and financial
assistance to the violator is not relevant. Mechanisms to increase transparency
certainly could have played a more active and important role. Kaufman argues
that the United States failed to detect most of Japan's violations. He goes on to
say that "Domestic politics inhibited effective response to those violations
about which the American public officials had full knowledge or at least some
suspicions."30 Kaufman is not specific about the response he has in mind, but it
appears likely that he is referring to the administration's lack of appetite for
retaliation rather than the mere initiation of some dispute settlement proce-
dure. This is hardly surprising. As Fred Ikle pointed out in his classic article,
"After Detection-What?" the importance of transparency almost inevitably
lies in the reaction that it provokes.3! This reaction is, of course, the substance
of enforcement.
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As the centerpiece of a sometimes problematic postwar trade regime, the
GATf provides researchers with a wealth of material about the sources of
noncompliance and the ability of its signatories to deal with them. Typical
examples of GATf violations include EC payments and subsidies to oilseed
producers, U.S. quantitative restrictions on sugar, Japanese import restrictions
on beef and citrus, and Canadian export restrictions on unprocessed salmon
and herring.32 This is just a sample of the long list of commonly employed
discriminatory techniques states have used to satisfy protectionist political
elements in contravention of the GA Tf's rules and norms.
Ambiguity about what constitutes noncompliance is a source of some of
these problems, but no one denies a considerable number of violations indeed
has occurred. The framers of the GA Tf were careful not to limit its policing or
dispute settlement procedures to actions that were prohibited explicitly.
Instead, they based enforcement provisions on the nullification or impairment
of benefits that countries might expect. Indeed, Article 23 permits that
settlement procedures be initiated
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it di-
rectly or indirectly under this agreement is being nullified or impaired or
that the attainment of any objective of the agreement is being impeded as
the result of (a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obli-
gations under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another contracting
party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this
Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation.33
Although variation in expectations doubtless exists, few parties-including the
states responsible-have argued that the EC subsidies of wheat flour or pasta
or the Multifiber Agreement, which clearly violated the most-favored nation
(MFN) principle, were based on confusion about the expectations of other
trading partners.
Capacity limitations and uncontrollable social and economic changes rarely
are cited as major determinants of violations. This is not so much because they
are never present but because their effect is dwarfed by the most conspicuous
cause of GATf noncompliance: the demands of domestic interest groups and
the significant political benefits often associated with protection. Though
GATf supporters would argue that any ill effects have been overshadowed by
the GATf's positive achievement of reducing tariffs, the demand for protec-
tion is not being entirely ignored.
If the managerialists are wrong about the source of the GA Tf's problems,
are they correct about the steps that appear to have reduced the rate of
violations? The GATf provides a better laboratory for evaluating the manage-
rialist claims about how compliance can best be improved than the Washington 34. Bayard,
35. Ibid.,7Q
36. Hudec 1
37. Sykes l~
38. Bayard:
39. PetersoJ
32. See, respectively, Hudec 1993, 559 and 568; Bayard and Elliott 1994,233; and Hudec 1993,
217-19.
33. The article is quoted in Bhagwati 1990, 105-6.
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Treaty because unlike the latter, the GATT has evolved. Dispute resolution in
the form of GATT panels undoubtedly has played some role, but certainly not
an overwhelming one. Until recently, the panels moved at a ponderous pace
and could easily be frustrated, especially by large states.34 Far more successful
have been the rounds of multilateral negotiations that have operated over time
to ensure that certain categories of disputes would reappear less often and that
have extended the boundaries of the regime.
Nevertheless, enforcement also has played an important, if controversial,
role in the operation and evolution of the GATT. Between 1974 and 1994, the
United States imposed or publicly threatened retaliation in 50 percent of the
cases that it took to the GATT. It did so independent of any GATT action and
indeed even in five cases that Bayard and Elliott believe would have fallen
under GATT jurisdiction.35 Observers such as Robert Hudec credit increased
enforcement and such "justified disobedience" of the GATT's dispute resolu-
tion process with being an important element in the process of GATT legal
reform.36 Others, like Alan Sykes, credit Section 301 and Super 301 unilateral-
ism with having inspired-ironically given the claims of the managerial
school-the enhanced dispute settlement procedures of the WTO.37 As Bayard
and Elliott conclude in their recent study, the "USTR [U.S. Trade Representa-
tive] generally wielded the section 301 crowbar deftly and constructively,
employing an aggressive unilateral strategy to induce support abroad for
strengthening of the multilateral trade system."38
Even in the case of environmental regimes, the source of many of the
managerialist emmples, enforcement plays a greater role in successes than one
is led to believe and its absence is conspicuous in some notable failures. For
example, until very recently compliance with the weakly enforced agreements
issued under eleven international fisheries commissions was highly problem-
atic. Agreement ambiguity and social and economic changes were not a major
source of these compliance problems. State capacity was more relevant since
monitoring catches is costly, but scholars agree that the developed states that
were often the principal violators could have coped with the monitoring issue if
they believe it was in their interest to do so. The crux of the problem was the
paradox of collective action: states saw little reason to pressure their fishermen
to obey rules that other states were likely to ftout.39 The creation of the
ZOO-mile exclusive economic zones was a dramatic improvement because it
made enforcement much easier. Consequently, the role of enforcement is
growing. For instance, in April 1995 a long-simmering dispute over fishing
rights in the North Atlantic among Canada, the EC, and the United States was
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resolved by an agreement that the New York Times reported, "could serve as a
model for preserving endangered fish stocks throughout the world." The key to
the accord, says the article, is "enforcement." The deal provides for elaborate
verification measures and "imposes stiff fines and other penalties for viola-
tions."40 The elaborate verification measures testify to the importance of
transparency, but to believe that they would be effective in the absence of
sanctions is naive. The benefits of cheating are too great to be offset by
transparency alone.
The cost of ignoring the connection between enforcement and compliance
when there is a substantial incentive to defect is well-illustrated by the
Mediterranean Plan, considered by many to be an example of how epistemic
communities have been able to playa significant role in effecting international
cooperation. The Mediterranean Plan achieved consensus by eliminating any
meaningful restrictions on dumping and providing no enforcement mechanism
for those minimal targets and restrictions that were agreed to. As a result, it has
been an embarrassing failure. Pollution has increased, dolphin hunting
continues, and despite a European Union ban on drift nets longer than 2.5
kilometers, the rules are widely flouted.41 The result has been a collapsing
ecosystem in the Mediterranean.
The complementary relationship between transparency and enforcement is
exemplified by a case that the managerialists believe to be an archetype of their
approach. The case, described by Mitchell, involves the attempt by the
International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) and its successor,
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), to regulate intentional oil
pollution by oil tankers. From 1954 until 1978, the regime had little success and
oil discharges were over three to thirty times the legallimit.42 In 1978 the IMO
switched strategies and with the negotiation of the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) began to regulate oil
pollution by requiring tankers to be equipped with segregated ballast tanks
(SBT). Despite the reduced cargo capacity and increased costs of equipping
new and old oil tankers with the new equipment, and "despite strong incentives
not to install SBT, tanker owners have done so as required. ...Compliance is
almost perfect."43
Why was the equipment regime so much more effective at inducing
compliance? It is not difficult to argue that increased enforcement was anything
but irrelevant. We learn for example, that "the [equipment violations regime}
provided the foundation for a noncompliance response system involving far
more potent sanctions than those available for discharge violations."44 State-
40. New York Times, 17 Aprill99S, A2.
41. "Dead in the Water," New Scientist, 4 February 1995,
42. MitcheIlI994b, 439 in particular.
43. MitcheIlI994a. 291.
44. Ibid., 289. 45. Ibid.,26t
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ments such as these suggest that while increased transparency was critical to
the success of MARPOL, it was also critical that tankers lacking the
International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP) certificate could be barred from
doing business or detained in port.
The huge opportunity costs of having a ship barred from port or detained
would force a tanker owner to think twice. ...A single day of detention
cost a tanker operator some $20,000 in opportunity costs, far higher than
typical fines being imposed. ...Detention provisions have altered behavior
because they have had the virtue of imposing. ..high costs on the violator,
making their use more credible and more potent. ..detention is a large
enough penalty to deter a ship from committing future violations.45
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The significance of the cases discussed above lies not in their representing
typical cases of noncompliance but in their salience and role as counterex-
amples to the unqualified prescriptions of the managerial theory. They should
also make us skeptical of any contention that mixed-motive game-based
cooperation (with its incentive for one or both sides to defect if they can get
away with it) plays only an insignificant role in regulatory regimes. If some
persistently have underestimated the value of interstate coordination vis-a.-vis
the solution of mixed-motive games, others should not commit the opposite
error of pretending that the latter-and enforcement-is irrelevant. This is
especially true in light of the likely evolution of regulatory cooperation.
Cooperation in arms, trade, and environmental regulation may begin with
agreements that require little enforcement, but continued progress seems
likely to depend on coping with an environment where defection presents
significant benefits. It is not appropriate to counter skepticism about the
success of treaties that require steep cuts in non tariff barriers, arms, or air
pollution but that contain no enforcement provision with statistics about the
average rate of compliance with international agreements that require states to
depart only slightly from what they would have done in the absence of an
agreement. Techniques used to ensure compliance with an agreement covering
interstate bank transfers cannot be counted on to ensure the success of the
WTO's new rules governing intellectual property.
It is possible, of course, that deeper cooperation (e.g., stricter arms control
or environmental regulation) can be ensured without much enforcement. This
can occur whenever the underlying game changes in such a way that there is
less incentive to defect from a given agreement. One of the points too rarely
made by either the managerial or political economy (i.e., enforcement) school
45. Ibid., 266 and 182-85.
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is that changes in technology, relative prices, domestic transitions, and ideas
have inspired more international cooperation and regulatory compliance than
have all efforts at dispute resolution and enforcement combined. This is
particularly true in the area of trade liberalization. As Kenneth aye recently
has noted, "Over the long term, the diffusion of ideas, the impact of
market-driven shifts in exchange rates, and fundamental concerns over
productivity and growth are more consequential sources of pressure for
reducing protection."46 Yet, while we agree that ideas and relatiye prices are
important determinants of compliance, they are not well-specified strategies
that instruct policymakers how they can increase the rate of compliance.47 We
know relatively little about how to use ideas to change preferences about
discount rates, consumption versus savings, or the environment and still less
about the endogenous manipulation of relative prices for policy aims such as
arms control. We know much more, as crude as our knowledge may be, about
the impact of enforcement coupled with managerial variables such as transpar-
ency.
If the managerialists want to hope (like most of ~s) that ideas or relative
prices will inspire states to value the environment more or to be more energetic
in controlling arms, this is understandable. It is nevertheless different from the
prescriptions that they are currently emphasizing and may also prove overly
optimistic. While some regimes appear over the years to have been strength-
ened by the changes in relative prices, the dissemination of progressive ideas
about the potential of cooperation, and the weakening of parochial domestic
interests, others have shown signs of weakening because of these same factors.
The nonproliferation regime, for example, has shown signs of fraying because
the relative cost of nuclear weaponry has declined.
We do not mean to imply that the managerial model and the failure to
embrace the idea that enforcement is often necessary are the only things
preventing deeper cooperation. Obviously, states have reasons to refrain from
vigorous enforcement. The question is whether it is better to cope with such
reluctance by declaring that its importance has been vastly exaggerated or by
trying to remedy matters.
We obviously prefer the second course of action, and we believe that the
managerialists' vision of cooperation and compliance distracts political scien-
tists from a host of problems that lie squarely within their area of expertise. For
example, the vast majority of political economists would argue that the reason
the GATr has encountered compliance problems and the reason why states
have not obtained the cooperative benefits that would be possible through the
use of more aggressive enforcement strategies involves an agency problem.
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47. For discussions of the impact of ideas on cooperation and compliance, see Goldstein and
Keohane 1993; P. Haas 1992; and E. Haas 1990. 48. Downs a
C~~'~~c"'.~'"7',:--'
C::'-;~~~~~"~~
Treaty compliance 399
ransitions, and ideas
cory compliance than
t combined. This is
enneth Dye recently
leas, the impact of
:ntal concerns over
ces of pressure for
Id relative prices are
I-specified strategies
of compliance.47 We
e preferences about
mment and still lessr 
policy aims such asIledge 
may be, about
)Ies such as transpar-
Political leaders, if not the consumers who make up their constituencies, are
left better off if they acquiesce to protectionist demands during those periods
(e.g., recessions, following a technological breakthrough by foreign competi-
tion) when interest groups are likely to pay a premium that is greater than the
electoral punishment they are likely to receive. Because the timing of such
events is uncertain and most leaders are similarly vulnerable to such events,
they deal with this situation by creating penalties for violations that are high
enough to prevent constant defection but low enough to allow self-interested
defection when circumstances demand it. Even leaders of states that are, for
whatever reason, more committed to free trade are reluctant to increase the
penalty for violations to a very high level because they suspect (probably
correctly) that the "protectionist premium" is at times far greater than the cost
of any credible punishment for violations. Thus, their hand is stayed not by any
appreciation for the accidental nature of defection but by an appreciation for
just how unaccidental it is.48
This is a dimension of political capacity that the managerial school rarely
discusses and that is unlikely to be exorcized by technical assistance. It is,
however, intimately connected to the design of both domestic political
institutions and international regimes. One possible strategy is to restrict
regime membership to states that will not have to defect very often. The idea is
that whatever benefit is lost by excluding such states from the regime will be
more than made up by permitting those that are included to set and also
enforce a deeper level of cooperation-in this case a higher standard of free
trade. This may be a reason, quite different from the large-n coordination
concerns of collective action theory, why many deeply cooperative regimes have
a limited number of members and why regimes with a large number of
members tend to engage in only shallow cooperation. Is this trade-off real?
Must states sometimes choose between aggressively addressing an environmen-
tal or trade problem and trying to create a community of states? We do not
know. What we do know is that to ignore the issue on the basis of high
compliance rates and the relative absence of enforcement is dangerously
premature.
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Appendix A
This appendix gives the assumptions of the model we use and some propositions derived
from these assumptions. Proofs are omitted.
ASSUMPTION 1. The utilities of states A and B, U A and U & have two continuous pa11ial
derivatives.
liance, see Goldstein and
48. Downs and Rocke 1995.
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ASSUMPTION 2. It is never in A's interest for B to have a greater amount of protection;
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where P is the level of protection. Similarly,
auB(po!, pH)
apo!
< 0,
ASSUMPTION 3. For any fixed value of pB, UA{PA, PB) is strictly increasing on [0, RA{PB)J
and strictly decreasing on [RA{PB),oo) as a function of pA, where the position of the
maximum may depend on PB. Declining marginal returns to protectionist measures together
with linear costs are sufficient to ensure this. This implies that there is a unique best response
RA{PB) by A to any choice by B. Similarly, for any fixed value of pA, UB{PA, PB) is strictly
increasing on [0, RB{PA)J and strictly decreasing on [RB{PA),oo) as a function ofPB.
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ASSUMPTION 4. A stability condition 30 < k < 1 such that RA(PB) ~ k, VpB guarantees
that there will be no trade wars with unbounded increases in tariffs. Similarly, RS(PA) ~ k
VpA.
TABLE Bl. (,
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ASSUMPTION 5. RA(pA) s 0, VPA and RiJ(PA) S 0, VpA. These represent nonincreasing
malginal returns to increases in trade protection.
-I
ASSUMPTION 6. RA(O) > 0 and Rs(O) > O. If the opponent has no tariffs or nontariff
barriers, then some nonzero amount of protection is the best choice.
Antarctic Treat}
"Hot Line" AgEl
Limited Test Sa
Outer Space Tn
Treaty of llatek
Protocol II to th
llatelolco
NonproliferatiO'
Seabed Arms C.
"Accident Measl
"Hot Line" Mol
Agreement
Biological Wear
"Incidents at Se
SALT I Interim
ABM Treaty
PROPOSITION At. In a neighborhood of the noncooperative tariff stnlcture, any utility
function satisfying assumptions 1-6 is approximately
UA(pA, PH) = aA(pB -~) + bA(pA -P3)2 (AI)
+ CA(PA -Pfj)(PB -P~)+ dA(PB -P~)2,
in which a < 0, b < 0, c > 0, and I c / 2b I < 1. In this case, the reaction function for A is
derived from equating the derivative to zero and is
RA{PB) = POt - CA
~ (PB -pg). (A2)
Then this satisfies all the conditions if the following conditions hold. (Assumption 1 is
satisfied automatically since U is a quadratic):
(1) For assumption 2 to be true at the equilibrium, we need a < O.
(2) For assumption 3 to be true, we need b < O.
~~~::~-:~
-:CC"~:~;~~
-;:; ~~..,
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lount of protection;
sing on [0, RA{PB)J
the position of the
;t measures together
!nique best response
'B{PA, PH) is strictly
ction of PH.
(3) If A is to react to an increase with an increase and to a decrease with a decrease,
we needc > O.
(4) For assumption 4 to be true, we need Ic/2b I < 1. This is a stability requirement.
When this is the case, unbridled competition returns to an equilibrium level af-
ter a series of turns; if not, then any out-of-equilibrium situation would result in
unbounded increases in protectionist measures.
(5) Assumption 5 is true always since the second partials of the reaction function
are zero.
(6) For assumption 6 to be true, we need
c
P3 + 2i,"pg > 0 (A3)
which is satisfied if PJ > kpg and pg > kPJ, so that the equilibrium is not too
far from even. Very uneven equilibria can occur with the general model, but the
global quadratic model is then no longer suitable.
Appendix B
The table below gives a chronology of arms control and related treaties and agreements,
including confidence- and security-building measures and measures related to transpar-
ency, nonproliferation, and defense conversion.
; k, VpB guarantees
lilarty, Rs{PA) ~ k
TABLE Bl. U.S. agreements ince 1945&
?sent nonincreasing
Signed Entered into forceAgreement
tariffs or nontariff
j
J1 December 1959
20 June 1963
5 August 1963
27 January 1967
14 February 1967
1 April 1968
-
tnlcture, any utility
B -Pg)2,
23 June 1961
20 June 1963
10 October 1963
10 October 1967
22 April 1968
Ratified by U.S. 8 May 1971
m function for A is 1 July 1968
11 February 1971
30 September 1971
30 September 1971
5 March 1970
18 May 1972
30 September 1971
30 September 1971
(Assumption 1 is 26 March 1975
25 May 1972
3 October 1972
3 October 1972
Antarctic Treaty
"Hot Line" Agreement
Limited Test Ban Treaty
Outer Space Treaty
Treaty of TIatelolco
Protocol II to the Treaty of
TIatelolco
Nonproliferation Treaty
Seabed Arms Control Treaty
"Aa:ident Measures" Agreement
"Hot Line" Modernization
Agreement
Biological Weapons Convention
"Incidents at Sea" Agreement
SALT I Interim Agreement
ABM Treaty
10 April 1972
25 May 1972
26 May 1972
26 May 1972
~'-:~:!!'.:o",
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TABLE Bl. continued TABLE Bl. c
Agreement Signed Entered into force Awe.
29 May 1972 29 May 1972 START Trial V
Stability Mea:
START ICBM'
Agreement-.
CW Verificatior
Exchange M(
INF VerificatiOl
tion MOU
U.S.-U.S.S.R. (
Agreement
2 Plus 4 Treaty
The Vienna I)()
CFE Treaty
Amendment I tl
INF Verificat
Amendment II
the INF Verjj
AmendmentID
INF Verificat
Amendment IV
INF Verificat
START Treaty
The Vienna Do
Treaty on Opel'
Lisbon START
Oslo Final DOC1
Implementat
U.S.-U.S.S.R.]
standing on 5
sive Arms
Open Lands M(
Korean Nuclear
tion Statemer
U.S. and Russia
Transportatif
tion of Weap
Fissile Material
Agreement
23 June 1973 23 June 1973
3 July 1974
3 July 1974
1 August 1975
28 May 1976
18 May 1977
26 May 1977
24 May 1976
11 December 1990
1 August 1975
11 December 1990
5 October 1978
Ratified by U.S. 19 November
1981
18 June 1979
3 March 1980
_b
17 July 1984 17 July 1984
Adopted 19 September 1986 Adopted 19 September 1986
15 September 1987 15 September 1987
8 December 1987
12 May 1988
1 June 1988
12 May 1988
31 May 1988
1 June 1988
31 May 1988
24 June 1988 24 June 1988
24 June 1988 24 June 1988
Declaration of Basic Principles
of Relations Between the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R.
Prevention of Nuclear War
Agreement Between the U.S.
and U.S.S.R.
ABM Treaty Protocol
Threshold Test Ban treaty
Helsinki Final Act
PNE Treaty
ENMOD Convention
Protocol I to the Treaty of
Tlatelolco
SALT II Treaty
Convention on the Physical Pro-
tection of Nuclear Material
"Hot Line" Expansion Agreement
Stockholm Accord I
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
Agreement
INF Treaty
INF Diplomatic Note on
"Weapons Delivery Vehicle"
INF Agreed Minute
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Ballistic Missile
Launch Notification Agreement
"Hot Line" MOU Modification
Agreement
INF Inspection Procedures
Agreement
INF Special Verification Com-
mission MOU
Treaty of Tlatelolco IAEA Safe-
guards Agreement
INF continuous Monitoring In-
spection Procedures Agreement
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Major Strategic
Exercises Notification Agree-
ment
20 December 1988 20 December 1988
17 February 1989 6 April 1989
9 June 1989 9 Jun~ 1989
23 September 1989 23 September 1989
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TABLE Bl. continued
Signed Entered into forceAgreementEntered into force
23 September 1989 23 September 1989May 1972
23 September 1989 23 September 1989
June 1973
23 September 1989 23 September 1989
21 December 1980 21 December 1989
1 June 1990 Not yet entered into force
3 October 1990
1 January 1991
9 November 1992
4 Apri11991
12 September 1990
Adopted 17 November 1990
19 November 1990
4 April 1991
May 1976
December 1990
August 1975
December 1990
October 1978
atified by U.S. 19 November
_b
4 April 1991 4 April 1991
11 December 199111 December 19917 July 1984
\dopted 19 September 1986
5 September 1987 11 December 1991 11 December 1991
Not yet entered into force31 July 1991
Adopted 4 March 1992
24 March 1992
23 May 1992
5 June 1992
June 1988
-
Not yet entered into force
I June 1988
31 May 1988 5 June 1992
24 June 1988 17 June 1992
4 June 1988
17 June 1992
0 December 1988
17 June 1992
Dated 17 June 1992
START Trial Verification and
Stability Measures Agreement
START ICBM Verification
Agreement
CW Verification and DATA
Exchange MOU
INF Verification Implementa-
tion MOU
U.S.-U.S.S.R. CW Destruction
Agreement
2 Plus 4 Treaty
The Vienna Document 1990
CFE Treaty
Amendment I to the MOA on
INF Verification
Amendment 11 to the MOAon
the INF Verification
Amendment III to the MOA on
lNF Verification
Amendment IV to the MOA on
INF Verification
START Treaty
The Vienna Document 1992
Treaty on Open Skies
Lisbon START Protocol
Oslo Final Document on FE
Implementation
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Under-
standing on Strategic Offen-
sive Arms
Open Lands MOU
Korean Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Statement
U.S. and Russian Agreement on
Transponation and Destruc-
tion of Weapons Proliferation
Fissile Material Containers
Agreement
i April 1989 17 June 199217 June 1992
9 June 1989
Not yet entered into force17 June 1992
23 September 1989
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TABLE Bl. continued References
Agreement Signed Entered into force
17 June 1992
17 June 1992
18 June 1992
17 July 1992
30 July 1992
28 August 1992
Abreu, Dilip. 19:
56:383-96.
Abreu, Dilip, Da
monitoring.Jo
~. 1989. Rt
paper, Yale U
Arora, Seema,.an
Participation i
28:271-86.
Barrett, Scott. I'
Papers 46:878-
Bayard, Thomas
Washington, [
Bhagwati, Jagdis
Press.
Burley, Anne-Ma
integration. In.
-.1991. A.
Preserving the
Norton.
Chayes, Abram, a
International S.
--.1993a.11
-.1993b.O'
Downs, George'
Arbor: Univer
-.1995. Of
Princeton, N.J
Duffy, Gloria. }'
Cooperation, e
Oxford Univer
Goldblat, Jozef. 1
Goldman, Emily.
Goldstein, Judith
University Pre
Grossman, Gene
84:833-50.
Haas, Ernst. 1 ~
Haas, Peter M..
International (
Haas, Peter M., F
of effective intel
Hawkins, Keith. I
Oxford Socio-1
Hudec, Robert E
unilateralism: ..
and Hugh T. P
--.1993. E"
Salem, N.H.~ E
Armored Blankets Agreement 17 June 1992
Emergency Response Equip- 17 June 1992
ment and Training Agreement
Joint Understanding Side Letter 18 June 1992
on Strategic Offensive Arms
FE lA Concluding Act 10 July 1992
U.S. DOD and Russian Presi- 30 July 1992
dent's CAW Committee
Agreement on CAW Destruc-
tion, Transport, or Storage
U.S. DOD and Russian 28 August 1992
MINATOM Agreement on
Cargo and Guard Railcar
Conversion Kits for Transpor-
tation of Nuclear Weapons
and Material
U.S. and Russian Agreement on Initialed 28 August 1992
Disposition of HEU
U.S. DOD and Russian 6 October 1992
MINATOM Agreement on
Technical Assistance for
Storage Facility Design for
Fissile Material
U.S. and Belarussian Agreement 22 October 1992
on Emergency Response and
Prevention of Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Emergency Response Equip- 22 October 1992
ment and Training Agreement
Export Control Systems Agree- 22 October 1992
ment
Continuous Communications 15 January 1993
Link Agreement
START II Treaty 3 January 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention 13 January 1993
Not yet entered into force
6 October 1992
22 October 1992
22 October 1992
15 January 1993
Not yet entered into force
Not yet entered into force
'Abbreviations and acronyms are as follows: ABM = Antiballistic Missile, CFE = Conventional
Forces in Europe; CW = Chemical Weapons; DOD = Department of Defense; ENMOD =
Environmental Modification; HEU = Highly Enriched Uranium; IAEA = International Atomic
Energy Agency; ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missile; INF = Intermediate-range Nuclear
Forces; MINATOM = Russian Nuclear Power Ministry; MOU = Memorandum of Understand-
ing; PNE = Peaceful Nuclear Explosions; SALT = Strategic Anns Limitations Talks; START =
Strategic Anns Reduction Talks.
bDashes indicate missing information.
'~cF~::~~~";C";"" 
"""",'7~:~~~;~~~~~'
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